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Sentence Reductions and Recidivism: 
Lessons from the Bastille Day Quasi Experiment 
 
This paper exploits the collective pardon granted to individuals incarcerated in French prisons 
on the 14
th of July, 1996 (Bastille Day) to identify the effect of collective sentence reductions 
on recidivism. The collective pardon generated a very significant discontinuity in the 
relationship between the number of weeks of sentence reduction granted to inmates and their 
prospective date of release. We show that the same discontinuity exists in the relationship 
between recidivism probability five years after the release and prospective date of release. 
Overall, the Bastille Day quasi experiment suggests that collective sentence reductions 
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More severe prison sanctions have plausibly a general deterrent effect on potential 
criminals, even on those who never served any prison sentence
3. But longer prison sentences 
may also have an additional specific effect on the subsequent decisions of those who actually 
served them. Very little is known on this effect of the experience of prison, on the way longer 
terms in prison actually affect post-release behaviours
4. Holding individual characteristics 
constant, does length of incarceration matter? Does it make a difference to be judged by more 
or less severe judges or to benefit from more or less generous sentence reductions?  
Proponents of longer incarceration argue that the experience of prison deters 
individuals from recommitting new offences and that this ‘specific deterrence’ effect 
increases with incarceration length. It is also believed that a longer incarceration deteriorates 
prospects for subsequent illegitimate income by removing individuals from the influence of 
non-incarcerated criminals. Opponents argue that the experience of prison is dehumanizing, 
that it hardens individuals and makes reinsertion more difficult. They also argue that longer 
terms in prison favour interactions with incarcerated persons, which may increase individuals’ 
criminal connections
5. A longer spell in prison entails losses of potential experience in 
legitimate work, but makes it possible for the justice system to better prepare post-release 
periods, through training or rehabilitation programs
6. All in all, longer incarcerations have 
                                                 
3 See Gary Becker (1968), the recent surveys by Steven Levitt and Thomas Miles (2006) or Shawn Bushways 
and Peter Reuter (2008), the recent contributions by David Lee and Justin McCrary (2005), Eric Helland and 
Alexander Tabarok (2007) or Daniel Kessler and Levitt (1999). 
4 An early conceptualization of the difference between the general deterrence effect of punishment (punishment 
as a threat) and the specific deterrence effect (the influence of the memory of past punishment) is provided by 
Glueck (1928). For a sociological contribution, see Smith and Gartin (1989). 
5 For recent evidence on prison as a “school of crime”, see Patrick Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson and David Pozen, 
2008. 
6 In France, the law stipulates that the mission of the penitentiary administration is not only to keep prisoners 
under supervision, but also to prepare their social reinsertion. 
  2ambiguous effects on the attractiveness of both illegitimate and legitimate activities after 
release and it is an empirical question to identify their net effect on recidivism.  
To address this issue, we ideally would like to compare otherwise similar inmates who 
have not served the same term in prison. One basic problem is that most sentence reductions 
granted by the penitentiary administration depend on individuals’ behaviour and 
characteristics. Holding original crime and sentence constant, inmates who obtain the largest 
sentence reductions (and serve the shortest terms) are typically those with the lowest 
recidivism risks. In such a case, the comparison of recidivism rates across inmates who served 
different terms for a given crime does not provide a credible evaluation of the causal effect of 
time actually served in prison on recidivism.  
To overcome this problem, this paper exploits the French collective pardon granted to 
inmates in July 1996, just before the Bastille Day (14
th of July, 1996).  As discussed below, 
individuals who were in French prisons by Bastille Day benefited from a basic sentence 
reduction of one week, plus one additional week of reduction per residual month of sentence 
by Bastille Day, with total reduction not exceeding 4 months. By construction, this collective 
pardon generated a very significant discontinuity in the relationship between time served in 
prison and prospective date of release
7. Inmates whose prospective date of release lies just 
after Bastille Day served on average a significantly shorter sentence than those whose 
prospective date of release was just before Bastille Day and who were by construction not 
eligible to the pardon. Interestingly enough, we find that a similar discontinuity exists in the 
relationship between recidivism rate and prospective date of release: five years after the 
release, the rate of recidivism of inmates whose prospective date of release is just after the 
Bastille Day is about 12 percent points larger than the rate of recidivism of those released just 
before the Bastille Day.  Overall, the discontinuous increase in collective sentence reduction 
                                                 
7 For example, an individual incarcerated the 1
st of June 1996 with prospective date of release 1
st of July 1996 
benefits from zero week of sentence reduction whereas an individual incarcerated 15
st of June 1996 with 
prospective date of release 15
st of July benefits from one week of sentence reduction.  
  3observed at the Bastille Day cut-off coincides with a discontinuous increase in recidivism. 
The corresponding regression-discontinuity estimate suggests that each additional percentage 
point in collective remission rate generates about one additional point of recidivism rate five 
years after the release.  
We develop a second identification strategy, building on the non-monotone, 
discontinuous relationship between the number of weeks of collective remissions granted to 
inmates and the residual sentence by Bastille Day. Focusing on the sub-population of inmates 
released after the Bastille Day and holding prospective date of release constant, the proportion 
of the original sentence served in prison first increases as date of incarceration becomes closer 
to the Bastille Day (because of the increase in the proportion of residual sentence by Bastille 
Day) and then falls abruptly to zero just after the Bastille Day (because of eligibility loss). 
Again, we find that the same non-monotone, discontinuous, relationship exists between 
recidivism rate and date of incarceration, with a significant negative shift taking place just at 
the Bastille Day cut-off. The corresponding instrumental variable estimate provides us with an 
evaluation of the effect of collective remission on recidivism which is as significant, and of 
the same order of magnitude, as our initial regression-discontinuity estimate.  
The key features of the French Presidential Pardon is that eligibility does not depend 
on individual characteristics, but varies discontinuously when prospective date of release or 
date of incarceration increases from just before to just after the Bastille Day. These 
institutional features make it possible to compare otherwise similar inmates who are granted 
significantly different sentence reductions. This comparison suggests that collective sentence 
reductions increase recidivism rates. This policy represents a plausibly less effective way to 
reduce incarceration rates and prisons’ overcrowding than alternative strategies previously 
analysed in the literature, such as sentence suspensions or individual sentence reductions, 
  4maybe because these alternative strategies preserve a more direct relationships between 
sanctions and individual behaviours.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an overlook of the related 
literature. Section 2 describes French institutions and the data available. Section 3 provides an 
evaluation of the effect of collective remission on recidivism using the discontinuity in the 
relationship between prospective date of release and Presidential Pardon. Section 4 provides 
an alternative evaluation using the non monotone, discontinuous relationships between the 
date of incarceration and the number of weeks of collective remission for inmates released 
after the Bastille day. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results and the last section 
concludes.  
 
I. Related  literature 
 
There is a large body of studies analysing the statistical relationships between time served in 
prison and recidivism (see e.g. the meta-analysis by Paula Smith, Claire Goggin and Paul 
2002), but most of these papers rely on simple OLS estimates and the corresponding 
evaluations mix the true effect of incarceration length and a selection bias (i.e., inmates who 
served longer terms are those with the highest potential of recidivism). In contrast, there exist 
very few evaluations relying on variations in incarceration length that are plausibly exogenous 
to recidivism potential.  
In a recent contribution, Ilyana Kuziemko (2007) exploits the mass release of prisoners that 
took place in the US, in the state of Georgia, in the early eighties. On March 18
th, 1981, the 
governor of Georgia ordered the release of 900 inmates to reduce overcrowding in local jails. 
A selection of non-violent inmates were ranked by day of prospective release and the 900 
closest to release were let out. Holding original sentence constant, the only reason for 
  5variation in sentence reductions across the inmates from this list was variation in date of 
incarceration. Kuziemko (2007) finds nevertheless that those who benefited from longer 
sentence reduction had significantly higher recidivism rate after the release. Assuming that 
date of incarceration is exogenous to recidivism, this result is consistent with longer 
incarceration having a negative effect on the recidivism rate of the least violent inmates. As 
noted by Kuziemko (2007), there are several reasons why this effect may not generalize to 
average prisoner. First, the immediate release surprised prisoners and those receiving the 
largest breaks may have been the least prepared for the release. Also, only a specific selection 
of offenders were released.  
In a related paper, Jeffrey Kling (2006) compares the labour market outcomes of 
otherwise similar individuals who have shorter or longer prison sentences because their cases 
were randomly assigned to more or less severe judges. He finds no significant differences in 
earnings and employment probabilities across judges. Assuming that judges’ severity affects 
subsequent outcomes only insofar as it affects incarceration length, this strategy suggests that 
incarceration length has no significant effect on inmates’ subsequent labour market outcomes.  
Randi Hjalmarsson (2008) exploits discontinuities in punishment that arise in 
Washington juvenile sentencing guideline to analyse the effect of incarceration on post-
release behaviour. She finds that incarceration reduces the probability of being reconvicted of 
a crime.  Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati and Pietro Vertova (2008) use the Collective 
Clemency Bill passed by Italian parliament in 2006 to identify whether sentence suspension 
has an effect on recidivism. Upon the approval of the Bill, a population of 22,000 inmates was 
released from Italian prison, but the Bill states that if a former inmate recommits a crime 
within five years following the release, he will be required to serve the residual sentence 
suspended by the pardon on top of the new sentence. They find that the commutation of one 
additional month of actual sentence into one additional month of suspended sentence reduces 
  6significantly the propensity to recommit a crime. This natural experiment captures the joint 
effect of the reduction of actual time spent in prison and of the corresponding increase in 
expected sanctions. Lawrence Katz, Steven Levitt and Ellen Shushtorovitch (2003) analyse 
variation in prison death across states and year, and find that this indicator of prison condition 
is negatively correlated with crime rates. This result is consistent with poor prison conditions 
deterring criminals either through lower recidivism (specific deterrence) or through general 
deterrence, if poor prison conditions are well known within the population of potential 
criminals. Chen and Shapiro (2004) exploit a discontinuity in the assignment of federal 
prisoners to security levels to show that harsher prison conditions (i.e., higher security level) 
do not lead to less recidivism. All in all, there is still little evidence on the causal effect of the 
experience of prison on post-release behaviours. To the best of our knowledge, the Bastille 
Day experiment considered in this paper is the first to provide an evaluation of the influence 
on an average prisoner of reductions in incarceration length that are proportional to residual 
sentences. 
 
II.   Institutional Context and Data Description 
 
Between 1990 and 2006, a collective pardon was granted to incarcerated persons each 
year, in early July, by the President of the French Republic
8. Specifically, a collective pardon 
act (decret de grace) was emitted by the President a couple of days before the Bastille Day 
(French national day, 14
th of July) granting sentence reductions that were approximately 
proportional to the residual sentence by the date of the act.  In 1996, the pardon act is emitted 
the 9
th of July and reduces residual sentences by one week, plus one additional week per 
                                                 
8 President Sarkozy has not used this right in 2007 after his election and the right of collective pardon has been 
removed from French constitutional law in 2008. 
  7residual month of sentence by the date of the act, with a limit of 4 months of overall sentence 
reduction.  A copy of the 1996 act is provided in Appendix.  
Whereas everything in a sentence and its execution is related to individual 
circumstances, almost everyone in prison is eligible to the Bastille Day pardon and to the 
corresponding sentence reductions. The only exceptions correspond to a small given list of 
types of crimes (terrorism, crimes against children, crimes against the administration of 
prison, see Appendix). Individual characteristics and circumstances, such as good behaviour 
in prison, crime history or reinsertion opportunities, are not taken into account and have no 
effect on eligibility. For the vast majority of crimes, the only determinant of eligibility is 
whether individuals are in prison by the date of the pardon act, that is whether they have been 
incarcerated before the Bastille Day and whether their prospective date of release is after the 
Bastille Day. This paper builds on each of these two institutional features to provide 
evaluations of the effect of collective remissions on subsequent recidivism rates.  
 
II.1  Data and variables 
 
The dataset corresponds to a sample of about 3,000 prison releases representative of 
those that took place in France between the beginning of May 1996 and the end of May 1997. 
For each observation, we have information on the exact date of release (tr), the exact date of 
incarceration (ti) as well as the original sentence length (denoted Dm). The actual length of 
time spent in prison is D=tr-ti and the ratio T= (D-Dm)/Dm represents the overall remission rate 
i.e., the proportion of the original sentence which has not been spent in prison. For example, T 
is equal to 1/3 for a person originally sentenced to 6 months of prison and who benefited from 
2 months of remission.  
  8With respect to recidivism, we have information on whether individuals were re-arrested 
before May 2002 as well as the exact date of re-arrest. Hence, it is possible to construct for 
inmates in our sample a dummy Y indicating whether the inmate has been re-arrested during 
the 5 years following the release. The overall recidivism rate after 5 years is about 45% in our 
dataset (see some basic statistics in Appendix, Table A1). 
With respect to collective remissions, we know whether inmates benefited from a Presidential 
Pardon in the past, either in 1996 or before, as well as the total number of weeks of collective 
remissions c.  The ratio C=c/(D+c)  represents what we call the collective remission rate, i.e., 
the rate of reduction of the incarceration length which has been specifically generated by 
collective remissions.  
Note that if I=(Dm –(D+c))/Dm denotes the individual remission rate (the reduction of the 
original sentence generated by all the non-collective remissions), we have the basic 
relationships between overall, collective and individual remissions :  
(1-T)≡(1-I)(1-C). 
The presidential pardon generates an increase in C and one important issue will be whether it 
is transmitted directly to T or whether the effect is mitigated by a decrease in individual 
remissions, as measured by I.  
With respect to regulations, the two basic determinants of the collective remission rate are 
whether the inmate is still in Prison by tc=1996, July the 9th and - for inmates still in prison 
by tc - the fraction of the sentence that potentially remained to be spent in prison by tc. 
Denoting ts the prospective date of release that would have been observed in the absence of 
the 1996 pardon, the first institutional determinant corresponds to the dummy variable 1(ts > 
tc) whereas the second one corresponds to the ratio f=(ts-tc)/(ts-ti) (for inmates such that (ts > 
tc)). For persons released before the tc cut-off or incarcerated after tc, ts is equal to the actual 
date of release tr. For persons incarcerated before t c and released after tc, we can set 
  9ts=tr+7(cs+1) where cs represents the number of periods of three weeks that have been 
actually spent in prison after tc. Given official regulations, each additional three-week period 
spent in prison actually corresponds to an additional month that should have been spent in 
prison minus an additional week of collective remissions. Given that our dataset provides a 
representative sample of releases for any tr lying between May 1996 and May 1997, it also 
makes it possible to construct representative sample of prospective release for any ts lying 
between the same dates
9.  
  
III.  The Effect of Collective Remission on Recidivism: A Regression-
Discontinuity Evaluation 
 
As discussed above, the first basic necessary condition in order to be eligible to the 1996 
presidential pardon is to still be in prison by the 9
th of July, 1996= tc. Inmates whose date of 
release is just before the tc cut-off are not eligible to the 1996 pardon. Their date of release 
would have been the same in the absence of the 1996 presidential pardon. In contrast, the vast 
majority of those whose date of release is after the cut-off have actually benefited from the 
1996 pardon and the corresponding collective remissions. Their actual date of release occurs 
after the tc cut-off, but before the date that would have been observed in the absence of the 
1996 pardon. To explore the relationship between remissions and recidivism, we are first 
going to build on this regulation and compare the outcomes of otherwise similar inmates who 
differ with respect to whether their prospective date of release took place just before or just 
after the tc cut-off. Put differently, our first identifying strategy uses the fact that Pardon 
                                                 
9 By construction, for any prospective ts lying between May 1996 and May 1997, the corresponding tr also lies 
between May 1996 and May 1997 and is actually represented in our dataset. Hence, our dataset makes it possible 
to construct sub-sample of releases representative of those satisfying t1≤ts≤ t 2, for any t1 and t2 comprised 
between 1996, May,1 and 1997, May, 31. 
  10regulations generate a discontinuity in the relationship between ts and the probability of 
pardon probability at the tc cut-off.   
 
III.1   Graphical Analysis 
 
To begin with, Figures 1a to 1d focus on the sample representative of male inmates whose 
prospective dates of release ts lie between May and September 1996 (i.e., about 2 months 
before and after tc) and show the variation in the probability of pardon and in the different 
rates of remission across fortnights of prospective release (ts).  
Comfortingly, Figure 1a confirms that pardon regulations generate a very significant 
discontinuity in the relationship between the prospective date of release ts and the probability 
of pardon. We find a 70 percentage points increase in the probability of benefiting from 
presidential pardon when prospective date of release ts moves from just below to just above 
the tc cut-off. The collective remission rate (C) increases from less than 3% before the cut-off 
10to above 10% after the cut-off (Figure 1b). French institutions actually generate a very sharp 
increase in probability of pardon and collective remissions just after the tc cut-off. In contrast, 
there is no evidence of a significant shift in rates of individual remissions after the cut-off 
(Figure 1c). It is around 25% just before and just after the cut-off. This result confirms that 
collective remissions are not used as substitute for ordinary individual remissions and 
contribute to an actual increase in the overall remission rate. Figure 1d further confirms that 
the shift in Pardon probability and collective remissions is actually accompanied by a very 
clear increase in the overall remission rate after the cut-off. The overall remission rate is about 
26% for dates of release just before tc and jumps above 32% for date of release just above tc.  
                                                 
10 C is not zero before tc because of the inmates who benefited from previous Bastille Day pardons (i.e., granted 
in July of year 1995 or before) and who were still in prison by May 1996. Note that our dataset does not provide 
information on the exact year when the different weeks of collective remission have been granted. We only have 
information on the total number of weeks of pardon. 
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Given these findings, one important issue is whether the shift in remission coincides with a 
change in the nature of the crimes committed. Interestingly enough, we do not find any 
discontinuous shift in the type of jurisdiction and procedure involved
11  (Figure 2a). There is 
actually no discontinuous change the type of crimes committed. For example, the proportion 
of thefts and receiving remains very close to 25% before and after the cut-off (Figure 2b). 
Also, we do not find any significant variation in the number of releases per fortnight before 
and after the cut-off (Figure 2c). Most importantly, Figure 2d does not show any significant 
shift in original sentence Dm just after the cut-off. We observe a smooth decline in original 
sentence length before the summer period (between early May and early July), but no 
discontinuity at the cut-off. The original sentence length is about exactly the same (near 500 
days) before and after the cut-off. Overall, the results in Fig. 2a-2d are consistent with the 
assumption that the nature and number of original sentences are very similar for inmates 
released just before or just after tc. The existence of the pardon does not seem to affect the 
behaviour of potential criminal, nor the severity of judges.  
Within this context, the next key question is whether we observe a significant change in the 
probability of recidivism after the cut-off. Interestingly enough, Figure 3 shows that the 
increase in remission rate just after the cut-off is accompanied by an unambiguous increase in 
recidivism rate. There is a smooth decline in recidivism before the cut-off - which coincides 
with the decline in original sentence length  observed in Fig. 2b - but when we compare 
inmates released just before and just after the cut-off, we observe a jump of about 10 percent 
points in recidivism. This pattern is consistent with the assumption that a reduction in time 
spent in prison due to collective remissions actually increases recidivism probability. 
 
                                                 
11 There is a  procedure correctionnelle for relatively minor crimes and a procedure criminelle for major ones. 
  12III.2   Regression Analysis 
 
Table 1 goes beyond simple visual evidence and provides regression-discontinuity estimates 
of the effect of presidential pardon on the probability of recidivism. Panel A uses the full 
sample (i.e., the sample representative of male inmates whose prospective date of release lies 
between May 1996 and May 1997) and provide estimates of the discontinuity in inmates’ 
outcomes at the tc cut-off.  Specifically, the first model shows the regression of a dummy 
indicating presidential pardon on dummy indicating whether the prospective date of release 
(ts) takes place after the cut-off date tc, holding a spline function of ts  constant (i.e., holding ts 
and (ts-tc) x 1(ts> tc) constant).  We also use a full set of 13 original sentence dummies as 
control variables. The regression confirms that there is a huge discontinuity in the probability 
of presidential pardon at the cut-off (about -67.2 percentage points). In contrast, the second 
model confirms that there is no significant discontinuity in original sentence at the cut-off 
date. Using the same specification, Table A2 in Appendix further shows that there is no 
discontinuity in the nature of the crime committed by persons released before and after the 
cut-off. Also we find no age discontinuity, no discontinuity in the proportion of single person 
and no discontinuity in the proportion of homeless at the cut-off.   
If we denote Y1i the potential recidivism of inmate i if he benefits from presidential pardon 
and Y0i the potential recidivism if he does not benefit from the pardon, the continuity of the 
length of the original sentence at the cut-off date is consistent with the assumption that the 
basic determinants of potential recidivism as well as the potential recidivism rates themselves 
are continuous at the cut-off. Under this maintained assumption, the ratio of the discontinuity 
in recidivism and the discontinuity in pardon provides an estimate of the causal effect E(Y1-Y0 
/ ts-tc) at the cut-off release date tc (see Hahn, Todd and Van Der Klaw, 2001).  
  13The third model shows that the discontinuity in recidivism is actually positive (which 
suggests a positive impact of pardon on recidivism) and statistically significant at standard 
level. Model (5) shows the corresponding regression-discontinuity estimate of the causal 
effect of pardon on recidivism and confirms that it is positive and significant at standard level. 
It is not significantly different from the OLS estimate given by model 4, however. The RD 
estimate suggests that presidential pardon yields an increase of about 18 percent points in the 
probability of recidivism five years after the release.  
Panel B of Table 1 tests whether these results are robust when we restrict the sample to 
prospective dates of release just above and after the cut-off. Specifically, it shows the 
regression results for the sub-sample of sentences with prospective release dates between May 
and September 1996 (i.e., two months before and after the cut-off). Generally speaking, the 
two first models confirm that there exist a very significant discontinuity in the probability of 
pardon at the cut-off date and that this discontinuity does not coincide with a discontinuity in 
original sentence. Also, the reduced form and IV estimates obtained with the restricted sample 
are very similar to those obtained with the full sample and provide us with a very similar 
evaluation of the causal effect of Pardon on recidivism. 
 
The presidential Pardon increases collective remissions and this is the simplest explanation 
for its effect on recidivism. Using the same specification as in Table 1, the first model of 
Table 2 confirms that there is a very significant discontinuity in collective remission rates at 
the cut-off (+12.5 percent points). The shift in remission rates is actually of about the same 
order of magnitude as the shift in recidivism rate. Assuming that pardon affects recidivism 
only through collective remissions, these findings suggest that the elasticity of recidivism rate 
to collective remission rate is close to 1. This is confirmed by the regression-discontinuity 
evaluation of the effect of collective remission rates on recidivism rate (model 3, Table 2).  
  14By focusing on the discontinuity at the 1996 Bastille Day cut-off, our regression-discontinuity 
estimate isolates the effect of the pardon granted in 1996 on eligible inmates. It is a mix 
between the effect of the 1996 Pardon on inmates incarcerated after the 1995 Bastille Day 
(and who benefited from the 1996 Pardon only) and the effect of the 1996 Pardon on inmates 
incarcerated before the 1995 Bastille Day (and who may have benefited from other Pardons). 
Table A3 in Appendix provides separate analysis for the two sub-samples. The estimates 
obtained with the sub-sample incarcerated after the 1995 Bastille Day are very similar to 
those obtained with the full sample. The effects obtained with the sub-sample incarcerated 
before the 1995 Bastille Day are much less well estimated, due to the small size of the sub-
sample (n=472). We observe positive shifts in collective remission and recidivism rates after 
the cut-off in this sub-sample too, but the effects are marginally significant only. Overall, the 
data do not make it possible to evaluate how exactly the marginal effect of an additional 
pardon on individuals incarcerated before the 1995 Bastille Day compares with the effect of 
benefiting from just one Pardon on those incarcerated after the 1995 Bastille Day.  
 
IV.   The Effect of Collective Remission on Recidivism: Alternative Evaluation 
 
Until now, we have only used one potential source of identification of the effect of collective 
remissions on recidivism, which is the discontinuous increase in collective remissions when 
prospective date of release ts moves from just below to just above the tc cut-off. In this section 
we are going to use a completely different feature of official regulations, which is the 
relationship between the number of weeks of collective remission generated by the 1996 
pardon and the residual sentence length at the tc cut-off.   
To be specific, consider an inmate whose prospective date of release ts takes place after the 
Bastille Day cut-off.  If his date of incarceration ti takes place before Bastille Day, the 1996 
  15pardon generates a number of weeks of collective remission which is about one quarter of (ts-
tc) the residual duration of incarceration by tc (one additional week of remission for each 
remaining month). The ratio f=(ts-tc)/(ts-ti) coincides with the fraction of the sentence that 
remains to be spent in prison by tc and the 1996 pardon generates an increase in the rate of 
collective remission C that is approximately proportional to f. In contrast, if the date of 
incarceration took place after the tc cut-off (i.e., f>1), then the 1996 pardon generates no 
additional week of collective remission and has no effect on C. 
Overall, focusing on individuals released after tc and holding prospective date of release ts 
constant, the collective remission rate generated by the 1996 presidential pardon should first 
increase with date of incarceration ti, as ti grows closer to the tc cut-off and as the ratio f=(ts-
tc)/(ts-ti) comes closer to the f=1 cut-off. Secondly, the collective remissions generated by the 
1996 pardon should fall abruptly as incarceration date ti moves from before to after the tc cut-
off and as the ratio f=(ts-tc)/(ts-ti) increases from just below to just above the f=1 cut-off. In 
other words, holding ts  > t c  constant, regulations should imply first an increase in the 
collective remission rate C with respect to the fraction of the sentence that remained to be 
spent in prison by the tc  cut-off, followed by a discontinuous decrease at the f=1 cut-off and 
by a flat relationship between C and f after the cut-off.  
 
To test whether this pattern is actually observed in the data, Figures 4a to 4c focus on the 
sample
12 of inmates whose prospective dates of release ts lie approximately in the middle of 
our post-pardon period (i.e., between November, 1996 and 2007, January) and provide an 
analysis of the variation in their collective remission rates, their recidivism rate and their 
original sentence when f increases from below to above the f=1 cut-off. To draw these graphs, 
we use a discrete measure of f with four values before f=1 and four values above f=1, 
                                                 
12The small fraction of individuals who have been incarcerated after the Bastille Day and who nevertheless 
benefited from the Pardon because they had been judged beforehand are dropped from the sample under 
consideration. The graphical patterns are very similar when we keep these observations.  
  16corresponding to the quartiles of the distribution of f below and above 1.  Figure 4a confirms 
that the collective remission rates first increase as f get closer to 1 (and as the fraction of the 
sentence that remains to be spent in prison by tc increases) and fall abruptly after the cut-off. 
This pattern is perfectly consistent with the official regulations of the Pardon.  Also, Figure 4b 
confirms that original sentence decreases continuously and monotonically as f increases from 
below to above 1. This is consistent with the very definition of f, which is inversely 
proportional to original sentence for any fixed value of ts. Within this context, the question is 
whether recidivism varies in the same non-monotonic, discontinuous way as collective pardon 
or whether it varies in the same continuous, monotonic way as original sentence. Most 
interestingly, Figure 4c shows that recidivism first increases continuously as f gets closer to 1, 
but undergoes the same negative shift as collective pardon at the the f=1 cutoff. This pattern is 
obviously consistent with collective pardon having a negative effect on recidivism.  
 
Table 3 goes beyond graphical evidence and provides a regression analysis where we use the 
residual sentence at the cutoff as an instrumental variable. To begin with, Model 1 of Table 3 
focuses on inmates released after the tc cut-off (i.e., ts > tc) and shows the regression of the 
collective remission rate C on a spline function of f=(ts-tc)/(ts-ti) with a knot at f=1, holding ts 
constant. It amounts regressing C on the fraction of the sentence that remains to be spent in 
prison by tc (as measured by the interaction fx(f<1)) and on a dummy indicating that 
incarceration takes place just after tc (as measured by the dummy variable 1(f≥1)), using 
prospective date of release ts and the ratio f as a control variables. The regression confirms 
that C first increases significantly with the fraction of the sentence that remains to be spent in 
prison (as measured by the significant and positive effect of fx(f<1)) then undergoes a 
significant drop at the f=1 cut-off (as measured by the significant negative effect of (f<1)) and 
  17finally remains stable after the cut-off (as shown by the non-significant main effect of  f).  As 
noted above, this pattern is highly consistent with official regulations.   
Given this fact, the question is whether we observe the same specific relationship between 
recidivism and f as between remission and f. Most interestingly, Model 2 in Table 3 confirms 
that this is the case. Focusing on inmates satisfying (ts > tc), the recidivism rate first increase 
with the fraction that remains to be spent in prison, then undergoes a negative shift at the f=1 
cut-off and finally remains flat when the ratio f becomes larger than 1. In substance, we 
observe the same highly non-linear, discontinuous, relationship between date of incarceration 
and recidivism as between date of incarceration and collective remissions. The third column 
provides the results of an Instrumental Variable evaluation of the effect of collective 
remission on recidivism using the fraction of the sentence that remains to be spent in prison as 
an instrumental variable (i.e.,  fx(f<1)) whereas the fourth column shows the results when we 
use jointly the fraction of the sentence that remains to be spent in prison and the dummy 
indicating that date of incarceration is above the cut-off as instrumental variables. 
Interestingly enough, both strategies provide a similar evaluation of the effect of collective 
remission on recidivism and this evaluation is itself very close to the evaluation obtained in 
the first part of the paper using the discontinuity in the relation between ts and remission as 
source of identification. Overall, the different approaches suggest that collective remission 
increases significantly the probability of recidivism, each additional point of collective 
remission being followed by an additional point of recidivism five years after the release.  
 
V. Discussion   
 
Incarceration rates are increasing dramatically in France as in many other western 
countries. French incarceration rate is about 97/100,000 in 2007 whereas it was about 
  1870/100,000 in 1985. More people are spending longer periods of time in French prisons than 
ever before, even though the French incarceration rate remains much lower than the American 
one. This penal policy has entailed important increases in the amount of money spent on 
prisons by tax payers, at the detriment of other governmental functions. In France, the cost of 
prison is about 2,000 euros per month and incarcerated individual, so that the increase in the 
number of inmates over the twenty last years represents an additional cost of about 400 
millions euros per year. For the sake of comparison, it is of the same order of magnitude as 
the budget devoted to educational priority zones, created in France in the early eighties and 
routinely criticized for being too cosmetic.  
Also, prisons’ capacity is not growing as rapidly as the number of incarcerated 
individuals, so that overcrowding is increasing and prison conditions are worsening 
dramatically. The estimated capacity of French prison is about 50,000 whereas the number of 
incarcerated persons is about 65,000, which yields an overcrowding rate of about 130%. The 
suicide rate in French prisons is one the highest observed in the western world. It is about 
24/10,000, which is twice more than in the eighties and much larger than in the US (about 
16/10000).   
Within this context, the issue of finding alternatives to prison is very high on the 
political agenda, in France as in many other western countries. This paper suggests that 
collective remissions – i.e., remissions that are not related to individual characteristics or 
behaviours – increase recidivism and may not be the most cost-effective option. Consider for 
example a sentence reduction of 10% granted to all French inmates (i.e., an average reduction 
of about one month granted to 65,000 prisoners). On the one hand, it would reduce current 
prison costs by about 130 millions euros (2,000 x 65,000). On the other hand, it would 
increase subsequent prison costs by about the same amount since it would increase the 
probability of re-incarceration five years after the release by about the same proportion of 10 
  19percentage points. Given that recidivism leads in general to longer prison terms, we can even 
speculate that this policy would increase prison costs in the long run. We would also observe 
a 10% increase in the number of re-arrests five years after the release, that is a minimum of 
about 6,500 additional crimes (65,000 x 10%). It is obviously very difficult to evaluate the 
social and economic costs of such an increase in crimes. Recent rough evaluations
13 suggest 
that the social cost of crime is about 25 billions euros per year in France. Assuming that only 
one third of this cost corresponds to recidivism, we can evaluate that the cost of the increase 
in crime rates would alone be as large as initial decrease in prison costs.  
Overall, even if it is very difficult to provide a precise evaluation, a collective decrease 
in incarceration length seems clearly not cost-effective. It seems much more effective to 
reduce incarceration length through sentence suspension, as in the Italian case analysed by 
Drago et al. (2008). Sentence suspension has the same positive short-term effect on 
incarceration rate and prison overcrowding, but it also reduces recidivism through increasing 
the general deterrence effect for ex-inmates.  From a different viewpoint, Farrington and 
Welsh (2005) provide a careful survey of existing randomized experiments on crime and 
justice which reveal that some preventive methods and court-mandated therapies are actually 
effective in reducing reoffending. Unfortunately, most of this literature has been conducted in 




This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of the experience of prison on 
inmates’ subsequent behaviour. Specifically, we use the collective pardon granted to French 
inmates on 1996 Bastille Day, to identify the effect of collective sentence reductions on 
                                                 
13 See Jean-Philippe Arlaud (2006). A recent evaluation by the British Home Office provides us with a much 
larger evaluation of about 60 billions pounds for England and Wales (Sam Brand and Richard Price, 2000).  
  20recidivism five years after the release. The pardon created a significant discontinuity in the 
relationships between incarceration length and prospective date of release at the Bastille Day 
cut-off. Also, holding prospective date of release constant, it generates discontinuous 
variations in the number of week of collective remissions granted to inmates across dates of 
incarceration. Most interestingly we show that the same discontinuities exist in the 
distribution of recidivism rates across inmates, which suggests a significant causal effect of 
collective sentence reductions on recidivism.  
As it turns out, sentence reductions granted on a collective basis seem to attenuate the 
deterrence effect of experience of prison on ex-inmates. This result stands in contrast with 
previous research (such as Kling, 2006) showing that individual variation in time served has 
essentially no effect on subsequent outcomes. It is the collective nature of the Bastille Day 
pardon which is plausibly problematic. Inmates who receive large collective remissions may 
form the impression that there is no direct relationships between ones’ individual behaviour 
and sanctions and thus be less deterred after their release.  
The quasi experiment used in this paper provides estimates of the average effect of 
collective sentence reductions. An open question is whether the effect is the same across the 
different groups of inmates. For example, it would be interesting to know whether the effect is 
as large for short and long sentences. It would make it possible a better targeting of sentence 
reduction policies. The sample used in this paper is not large enough to address this issue. 
Another important question is whether the experience of prison affects the nature of 
recidivism, on top of its frequency. The next step on our research agenda is to collect larger 
dataset with more detailed information on post-release behaviours in order to shed light on 
these issues.  
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Figure 2b: Proportion of thefts and receiving, Before and After tc=1996, July the 9
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Figure 2d: Original Sentence Length (Dm, in days), Before and After tc=1996, July the 9
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Figure 3: Probability of Recidivism, Before and After tc=1996, July the 9
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  30Table 1: The Effect of the Pardon on Recidivism: Estimates Using the Discontinuity in 
Relationship Between Presidential Pardon and Prospective Date of Release.   
 
















































       






































yes yes no yes yes yes 
Nb  Obs. 2605 2605 2605 2605 2605 2605 
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yes yes no yes yes yes 
Nb  Obs.  894 894 894 894 894 894 
Full Sample (Panel A) : Male, prospective date of release ts between May 1996 and May 1997.  
Restricted Sample (Panel B) : Male, prospective date of release ts between May and September 1996. 
All regressions include a full set of (thirteen) dummies indicating the number of months of imprisonment (Dm) 
the individuals have been sentenced to. Standard errors are in parenthesis and * indicates coefficients which are 
significant at the 5% level. 
  31Table 2: The Effect of Collective Remission Rate on Recidivism: Estimates Using the 
Discontinuity in Relationship Between Presidential Pardon and Prospective Date of Release.   
 





















       






















yes   yes  yes 
Nb Obs.  2605    2605  2605 
Sample: Male, prospective date of release ts between May 1996 and May 1997.  
All regressions include a full set of (thirteen) dummies indicating the number of months of imprisonment (Dm) 
the individuals have been sentenced to. Standard errors are in parenthesis and * indicates coefficients which are 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
  32Table 3: Effect of Collective Remissions on Recidivism: an Evaluation using the 
Relationship Between Collective Remissions and Fraction of the Sentence that remained to be 
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Nb  Obs.  2150  2150  2150  2150 
        




  33Appendix 
 
Table A1: Basic Sample Description 
 
 Mean  Std   
Recidivism .453  .010 
Presidential Pardon  .473  .010 
Original Sentence (days)  541.0  19.9 
Collective remission rate  .112  .003 
Overall remission rate  .324  .007 
Release after Bastille Day  .826  .007 
Non French  .302  .009 
Age at release (years)  31.8  .20 
Homeless .170  .007 
Married .839  .007 
Nb. Obs.  2605  2605 
Sample: Male, prospective date of release ts between May 1996 and May 1997, (N=2605). 
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Table A2: The Discontinuity in Individual Characteristics and Crime Characteristics at the 9
th 
of July cut-off. 
 































Sample: Male, prospective date of release ts between May 1996 and May 1997, (N=2605). 
Reading: This table shows the results of regressing individual characteristics (age, single, non-french, homeless) 
and crime characteristics on a dummy indicating whether release took place after the July, 9
th threshold, using 
the same specification as Table 1. We find no significant discontinuities in either individual nor crime 
characteristics at the cut-off.  
 
 
Table A3 : Variation in the effect across incarceration dates. 
 Sub-sample  incarcerated 
after 1995 Bastille Day. 
 Sub-sample  incarcerated 










- -  .79* 
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yes yes yes   yes yes 
Nb. Obs.  2130  2130  2130    472  472 
Sample: Male, prospective date of release ts between May 1996 and May 1997, (N=2605). 
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